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BEYOND WELFARE REFORM: CAN WE BUILD A
LOCAL WELFARE STATE?
Frank Munger*

I. INTRODUCTION
In the twenty-first century, privatization of the American
welfare state continues. Provision of welfare for workers and
poor is increasingly left to the discretion of employers or
charities. Reliance on public or private welfare by those who
cannot make ends meet has always been stigmatized as dependency. Now, dependency is the point of attack on the poor
and workers alike. Welfare for the poor has been severely restricted, and the number of impoverished, mother-only families aided by public benefits has been cut in half. Similarly,
increasing restrictions are placed on private pensions, health
insurance, workers compensation, unemployment compensation, and even bankruptcy relief from overburdening debt. 1
The "dependent" poor and the low-wage labor force are increasingly denied social citizenship, immigrants in their own
society.
Advocates for the poor have long attempted to influence
national policy deliberations. They urge greater collective
economic security, making the case for civil rights for both the
poor and others excluded from a full life by circumstances beyond their control. Entitlements they have won for the poor
mark the boundary of full social citizenship. But advocates
for the poor are now losing most battles for welfare rights and
* Professor of Law, New York Law School, J.D., Ph.D., University of
Michigan.
1. See, MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP: REDEFINING THE
AMERICAN WELFARE STATE (2001). See generally Jean Braucher, Consumer
Bankruptcy as Part of the Social Safety Net: Fresh Start or Treadmill?, 44
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1065 (2004); Deborah Maranville, Unemployment Insurance Meets Globalization and the Modern Workforce, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1129 (2004).
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economic redistribution at the national level. Today, proposals for expanding rights for the poor, disabled, minorities,
women, and immigrants meet stiff resistance. As a result,
new proposals are less broad and less numerous. Equal welfare for all members of our society-national health care,
adequate pensions, unemployment for all the unemployed, a
minimum wage corresponding to the minimum cost of living,
and a living wage for care work as well as market work-is
disfavored. The notion of equal welfare indeed seems unthinkable in an era when the welfare state is under attack
and nearly all forms of welfare are being rolled back or indexed to wealth. 2
The cutting edge in welfare advocacy, many activists
seem to argue, is not advocacy for rights and redistribution at
the national level, but rather advocacy within communities.
Activism from below continues to keep a long tradition of mutual assistance, community economic development, and other
experiments in economic democracy alive. Now the focus is
on .opportunities to create progressive forms of welfare
through local organizing and co-optation of private and public
authority at the local level.
Projects to build local welfare institutions have produced
some notable successes. However, the small numbers of successful projects and the limited scope of those projects raise
important questions about whether local political alliances
seeking redistributive public and private welfare can succeed
as a wider strategy for building a more inclusive welfare
state. As advocates and scholars seek a better definition of
the local-state welfare project, they must define both its goals
and preconditions, and they must identify means of achieving
the improbable-inclusion of the poorest, least stably employed, lowest paid working poor.
2. Poor, working class, and middle income persons (especially middle income home owners), those with enough wealth to invest, and corporations all
receive different packages of welfare benefits from the government in the form
of income supplements, tax breaks, or other subsidies. The largest of these
benefits, including the home mortgage tax exclusion and special tax breaks and
subsidies for corporations, together with the skewed tax reductions of the past
several years, insure that the distribution of welfare favors those with wealth
even while expenditures for the very poor are reduced. See, e.g., KEVIN
PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
RICH (2001); see also WILLIAM GALE ET AL., CENTER FOR BUDGET & POLICY
PRIORITIES, THE ULTIMATE BURDEN OF THE TAX CUTS (June 2, 2004), available
at http://www.cbpp.org/6-2-04tax.htm.

2004

BUILDING A LOCAL WELFARE STATE

1001

In this brief comment, I focus on recipients of traditional
welfare-poor single mothers-and their needs. I describe
the failure of welfare reform, together with some of the lessons we have ignored but could learn from successful welfare
experiments about how and why welfare should be provided.
I conclude with a brief and preliminary analysis of some of
the political and conceptual issues that advocates face in sustaining political alliances at the community level. I draw on a
growing literature describing strategies for deepening democracy in communities. Importantly, this analysis illustrates
how emerging strategies for democratic experimentalism and
deepened community democracy depend on national poverty
advocacy that uses the rhetoric of the market and devolution
to provide benchmarks, mandates, and local authority for
administration of redistributive policies.

II. WELFARE
Welfare Reform: Watching as Caring
Anglo-American relief for the poor reflects underlying
moral judgments about dependency. Those who are unable to
attain self-sufficiency through market labor, and not excused
by disability or age are morally stigmatized as "undeserving"
poor. 3 Since Elizabethan times, 4 welfare for the poor has been
administered under conditions designed to drive all but the
most desperate into the labor market-a corrective for their
moral weakness and stern example to others.
Once again, welfare reform has "cured" dependency by
pressuring recipients to leave welfare for work-any work.
Contemporary welfare reform politics has reinforced the identity of "undeserving" poor. Professor Sanford Schram argues
that the current welfare reformers have succeeded in creating
a "medicalized" identity for welfare recipients as individuals
who suffer from the "disease" of dependency. 5 The prescription for this disease is tough administration of work and
6
child-bearing requirements for those who seek welfare. As
A.

3. See generally JOEL HANDLER & YEHESKEL HAsENFELD, WE THE POOR
PEOPLE: WORK, POVERTY & WELFARE (1997).

4. See id. at 21.
5. See SANDFORD

SCHRAM, AFTER WELFARE:
POSTINDUSTRIAL SOCIAL POLICY 59-71 (2000).
6. See id. at 63-70.
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Lawrence Mead has said, the discipline imposed by strict administration of welfare is the reform. 7 After 1996, entitlements are fewer, obligations are more numerous, and recipients are continuously supervised and micromanaged. 8
Denying aid to all but the most severely disadvantaged seems
to confirm the claim that welfare recipients are those who
have become helplessly dependent. Conversely, the vast
number who left welfare (many, if not most, for violating any
of numerous bureaucratic rules) seems to confirm that most
should not have received public benefits in the first place.
In contemporary welfare politics, thinly veiled class interests contend. From its inception, the American welfare
state keyed social citizenship to individual qualifications,
primarily work history and earnings-both determined by
employers. 9 Welfare reforms have arrayed pro-market, probusiness advocates who favor a low-wage, flexible, and docile
work force against advocates for the economically insecure,
favoring pooled risk and greater economic opportunity that
would permit individuals to enter the labor market on their
own terms. The ideology of the market dominates, and both
major political parties support flexible labor policies, reduced
government welfare, and "marketized citizenship" linking
adequate welfare benefits even more tightly to success in the
labor market. Provision of welfare for workers and poor is increasingly left to the discretion of employers or charities.
While the scope and benefit levels of social citizenship have
been continuously contested, 10 the structure of the American
7. See id. at 71.
8. Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121 1145-72
(2000).
9. See generally JENNIFER KLEIN, FOR ALL THESE RIGHTS: BUSINESS,
LABOR, AND THE SHAPING OF AMERICA'S PUBLIC-PRlvATE WELFARE STATE
(2003).
10. See JOEL HANDLER & YEHESKEL HAsENFELD, THE MORAL
CONSTRUCTION OF POVERTY: WELFARE REFORM IN AMERICA 82-132 (1991). The
poor who are deemed undeserving and the stereotypes associated with them
have changed over time but the meaning is always the same-dependency is an
individual failing and a moral hazard of welfare. Id. at 82-85. The modern history of American welfare reflects political struggle about the categorization of
particular groups. Id. Since the New Deal elderly workers have come to be perceived as deserving, while white widows were deserving of carefully administered aid and distinguished from both immigrant poor and persons of color who
received little aid. Id. at 105. Since the 1960s, another shift in perceptions has
associated welfare dependency with young unmarried African American moth-
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welfare state has remained essentially unchanged: discipli11
nary welfare for the poor and welfare capitalism for the rest.
B. Leaving Welfare, Even Poorer
The purported evidence of welfare reform's "success" is
the 53% decline in welfare caseloads between 1996 and June
2000. 12 Underlying the claim is an assumption that reform
has enabled welfare "leavers" to enter employment and,
within a short period, achieve self sufficiency. 13 These assumptions about the reasons for leaving welfare and the
benefits of employment among former recipients are mistaken. At the height of labor market growth, in the late
1990s and before the recession, more than 17% of the full
time prime age labor force in the United States earned less
than the poverty level. 14 For women, the percentage was
ers and a shiftless population of African American males who father their children. Id at 114.
11. See generally KLEIN, supra note 9.
12. See Sanford Schram & Joe Soss, Success Stories: Welfare Reform, Policy
Discourse, and the Politics of Research, in PRAXIS FOR THE POOR: PIVEN AND
CLOWARD AND THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN SOCIAL WELFARE 195 (Sanford Schram ed., 2002).
13. Reformers have sometimes said that employment will lift these leavers
out of poverty, but ending poverty was not among the legislative purposes included in TANF, the 1996 welfare reform legislation. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. § 1601 (2004); see
also Ron Haskins, Effects of Weltare Reform on Family Income and Poverty, in
THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE 119-20 (Rebecca Blank & Ron Haskins eds.,
2001).
14. Year round attachment to the labor force means that an individual is
working or looking for work fifty weeks a year. See LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL.,
THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2001-2002, at 322 (2001). Based on the Department of Labor's poverty measure, more than 34 million Americans live below the poverty line, and over 14 million have incomes less than halfthe poverty line. See ROBERT GREENSTEIN ET AL., CENTER FOR BUDGET & POLICY
PRIORITIES, POVERTY INCREASES AND MEDIAN INCOMES DECLINE FOR THE
SECOND CONSECUTIVE YEAR (Sept. 23, 2003), at http://www.cbpp.org/9-2603pov-fact.htm. Tragically, the poor are getting poorer. The number deemed
poor would vastly increase using the poverty standard accepted in many other
economically developed societies. For a discussion of alternative measures of
poverty and the general acceptance among European governments of a higher
threshold, see Katherine McFate et al., Markets and States: Poverty Trends and
Transfer System Effectiveness in the 1980s, in POVERTY, INEQUALITY AND THE
FUTURE OF SOCIAL POLICY: WESTERN STATES IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 30
(Katherine McFate et al. eds., 1995). Measured by the U.S. poverty standard,
the poverty rate is rising and three million more Americans are poorer now
than they were in 2000. Id The poverty gap is also rising-the gap between
the average poor person's income and the official poverty line. Id
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much higher-nearly one quarter of all women with full time
labor force attachment did not earn enough to raise them
above the poverty line. 15 For these Americans, work is insecure, without affordable health care or other benefits, and requires great flexibility in scheduling family commitments.
This is the labor market that poor women leaving welfare
have entered, and the labor market in which most will re•
16
main.
In spite of low wages and lousy jobs, women always left
welfare for work rather quickly. Under the prior welfare program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, more than
50% of all recipients left within one year. 17 Thus, early departures from welfare have been the historical norm, not the exception.
What explains recently declining welfare caseloads? Research by economists has concluded that the strong economy
and increases in the Earned Income Tax Credit have been the
most important factors that explain any increase in work. It
is possible that much of the decline has little to do with increasing employment among poor women, and is likely due to
aggressive diversion programs that discourage new applications for welfare. Further, there is evidence tha:t the administration of sanctions for violating bureaucratic regulations
may account for up to 40% of welfare exits in some states. 18
The latest studies by the Urban Institute show that only 42%
of recent leavers are working (compared to 49% in 1999), and
more than one quarter quickly returned to the TANF program. 19
15. See MISHEL, supra note 14, at 322.
16. See generally Dorothy Roberts, Welfare Reform and Economic Freedom:
Low-Income Mothers' Decisions About Work at Home in the Market, 44 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1029 (2004).
17. HANDLER & HAsENFELD, supra note 3, at 46.
18. See Schram & Soss, supra note 12, at 197.
19. See PAMELA LOPREST, URBAN INST., How ARE FAMILIES THAT LEFT
WELFARE DOING? A COMPARISON OF EARLY AND RECENT WELFARE LEAVERS
(2001) [hereinafter LOPREST, COMPARISON OF WELFARE LEAVERS), at
http://www.urban.org/template.cfm?Template=ITaggedContent/ViewPublication
.cfm&PublicationlD=7249&NavMenulD=95; see also PAMELA LOPREST, URBAN
INST., FEWER WELFARE LEAVERS EMPLOYED IN A WEAK ECONOMY (2003), at
http://www.urban.org/urlprint.cfm?ID=8550. About 4% were surviving on other
government programs such as SSI, and 7.6% had a working family member who
supported them. LOPREST, COMPARISON OF WELFARE LEAVERS, supra. More
than 20% had no current source of income (although about one third of these
had worked recently). Id
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Most leavers who work are still very poor. In 1998-in a
strong economy-leavers' earnings ranged from $665 to $1083
per month, well below the poverty threshold for a family of
three set at $1095 per month. 20 One third reported cutting
meal sizes and skipping meals, and more than one third were
unable to pay rent or utilities on a regular basis (46% in
1999). 21 How could such families afford health care, child
care, transportation to work, and other costs associated with
employment? How many have had to return to violent partners?22 To help meet some of the costs, welfare reform provided funding for transitional Medicaid and child care. 23 Yet
the Urban Institute reported that most leavers were not actually receiving Medicaid, child care assistance, or food
stamps. 24
The critical point is that we know how to create a better
welfare state without massive redistribution. TANF's "work
first" emphasis was based loosely on early welfare-to-work
experiments that pushed a few more women to leave welfare,
but which also showed that improvements in well-being
would be small at best and short lived. 25 Those experimental
findings were not wrong. We also have findings from other
experiments that succeeded in providing assistance to poor
families in ways that TANF has failed. 26
C. Flexibility and Choice: Lessons from the Other Welfare
Experiments
Experiments with alternative forms of welfare provision
have demonstrated that family welfare can be improved, employability enhanced, and poverty reduced by taking a differ20. See Schram & Soss, supra note 12, at 197.
21. Seeid

22. The NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund estimates that 30% of
current TANF recipients experience domestic violence and up to 60% have suffered violence at some point. See NOW LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND,
WELFARE REAUTHORIZATION: DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2001), at
http://www.nowldef.org/html/issues/wel/violence.shtml.
23. See Child Care & Development Block Grant, 42 U.S.C. § 9858 (1990) as
amended by Pub.L. 104-193 (1996), Title VI § 603(a). Transitional Medicaid
benefits are mandated by TANF. See42 U.S.C. § 608(s)(ll)A (2004).
24. Fifty-three percent of leavers were not receiving Medicaid, 81 % did not
receive child care assistance, 85% did not receive help finding a job, and 69% did
not even receive food stamps. See Schram & Soss, supra note 12, at 199.
25. See HANDLER & HAsENFELD, supra note 10, at 67.
26. See id at 216.
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ent approach. Such experiments point to a key element of
success: enabling poor women to manage their own lives so
that they can choose and pursue a good or better quality life
for themselves and their families.
The first lesson from welfare experiments is that it is the
labor market that has failed to provide jobs with living wages
and benefits, or enough jobs of any description for which the
poor, unemployed, and those currently discouraged from looking for work are eligible. Leading scholars Joel Handler and
Yeheskel Hasenfeld have concluded that the vast majority of
welfare recipients have been ready, willing, and able to work,
and that they would leave welfare if a job enabled them and
their. families to survive. 21 Evaluation of welfare-to-work
experiments conducted during the 1980s and 1990s revealed
an alternative to the relatively cheap "work first" strategy
that became the model for welfare reform. A few states
provided access to a wide range of services, extending over
long periods of time. Not surprising, these programs were
more successful at moving recipients into better jobs and at
moving some hard-to-employ recipients into work. 28 Although
these programs have contributed greatly to our
understanding that poor women will voluntarily seek the
services they need to help them become more self-sufficient
and to become employable, the programs are more costly.
After reviewing prior welfare-to-work experiments, Handler
and Hasenfeld conclude that "the most fundamental reason
why welfare-to-work programs fail is that they are seldom
truly intended to respond to the needs of welfare recipients." 29
More recent experiments, some supported by private
funding, show that the right kind of assistance can make a
sustainable difference. For example, the New Hope experiment offered 1300 randomly selected poor families in Milwaukee, Wisconsin a flexible package of benefits that included a wage supplement, Medicaid, center-based and afterschool child care, and intensive counseling and support. 30

27. See id. at 82-132.
28. See id. at 7 4.

29. Id at 91.
30. See ALETHA C. HUSTON ET AL., MANPOWER DEV. RES. CORP., NEW HOPE
FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN: FIVE-YEAR RESULTS OF A PROGRAM TO REDUCE
POVERTY AND REFORM WELFARE, at www.mdrc.org (2003) (last visited Sept. 30,
2003).
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Participants were required to work a minimum of thirty
hours a week, and employment was guaranteed by the project,31 which supplied community service jobs when no other
work was available. One of the project's critical limitations
was the mandatory link between benefits and work commitment, but for working participants the benefits were flexible
and relatively generous. The project lifted many families out
of poverty, and encouraged more work at higher wages. 32 The
most striking finding was that the children benefited educationally and socially from stable, quality day care and a more
stable home environment. 33 Important qualities distinguish
this experiment from TANF, including respect for choices
made by the families concerning work, child care, and the
package of supporting services. The program itself emphasized flexibility, stability, empathetic counseling, and ending
poverty. New Hope findings have been confirmed by in-depth
research by other scholars who underscore the importance of
flexible employment as well as stable, parent-chosen quality
day care. 34
The New Hope experiment is not the future, but it points
the way. Follow-up analysis by the Joint Center for Poverty
Research suggested that the results of New Hope could be
vastly improved by providing specialized services for the
women who were unable to take advantage of New Hope's
benefits. Some women lacked proper information. Others
needed services related to mental health problems, substance
abuse, or domestic violence and other sources of family instability. 35 Most importantly, evaluators suggested that flexibility was a key to success. 36 They recommended, for example,
improving outcomes by separating the benefits offered by future programs from work requirements, to support parents'
preferences for more flexible employment and care work
Seeid
Seeid.
Seeid.
See Julia Henly & Susan Lambert, Linking Workplace Practices to
Care Requirements: Lower-Level Workers in Lower-Skilled Jobs, in
WORKFORCE/WORKPLACE MISMATCH? WORK, FAMILY, HEALTH, & WELL-BEING
(Suzanne
Bianchi
et
al.,
eds.,
2003),
at
http://www.popcenter.umd.edu/conferences/nichd/papers/henly.pdf.
35. See Thomas S. Weisner et al., Understanding Working Poor Families in
the New Hope Program, 6 Pov. RES. NEWS 3 (2002).
36. Seeid
31.
32.
33.
34.
Child
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scheduling. 37 Further, a follow-up evaluation after five years
showed that the benefits of flexibility and choice have been
sustained, particularly for the children of these families. 38
The failure of 1996 welfare reform to end poverty and the
relative success of experimental alternatives has clear implications. Poverty can be reduced by providing the following
resources, available to many with incomes above the median,
but unavailable to a large proportion of those who earn less,
and almost universally absent among those who work and
earn less than the poverty level: (1) decent work, including
adequate income, stability, and flexibility to accommodate
family and personal needs, (2) flexible day care accommodating parents' scheduling and values and which supports early
learning and social development, (3) health insurance, (4)
stable housing (not a part of the Milwaukee experiment but
the participants mostly lived in housing with which they were
satisfied), (5) empathetic counseling-strongly endorsed by
the New Hope participants who received counseling on financial matters, family problems, personal health including mental health problems, community resources, and which provided emotional support.
There are few surprises here. The effects of more flexible
and generous support for employment and care work are easy
to see in New Hope's measures of parent success and especially child well-being. The annual per family cost of the New
Hope experiment was a modest $5300. 39 Although the cost of
New Hope's services was relatively modest, these welfare experiments show that adequate welfare will require a greater
investment of resources.
The critical question is how can the lessons from these
experiments be applied in an era when new programs requiring redistribution at the national level are very unlikely to be
enacted?

D. Redefining Welfare
Welfare reform in the 1990s was captured by the symbolic politics of dependency. If welfare were freed from its association with false assumptions about the causes of poverty
37. Seeid.
38. See HUSTON ET AL., supra note 30.
39. Some, but not all families also received benefits under Wisconsin's W2
welfare reform program and federal benefits. See id.
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and stereotypes of poor mothers, what should advocates seek
in order to help poor families and lift them out of poverty? Of
course, welfare cannot be separated from the symbolic politics
of the welfare state, and that problem raises the question of
political strategy that I will discuss in the last section. 40
Nobel prize-winning economist Amartya Sen has suggested that extreme economic inequality is a social condition
brought about by society's failure to create individual capability.41 Inequality, in this view, arises from conditions that restrict development of an individual's capabilities. Conditions
that limit material resources literally render one poor, but
they are not the only, or perhaps even the most important,
societal failure that undermines well-being and hope for improvement. Adequate education, health care, and social support are equally critical. A true definition of poverty, he argues, is the failure to develop capability to participate in
society and to thrive. 42 Thus, as he has noted, materially poor
Bengladeshi may thrive relative to some materially better off
urban African American teens, who have a much shorter life
expectancy. 43
Sen's arguments are greatly illuminated by Professor
Lynne Haney's study of welfare for poor women under successive political regimes in Hungary. 44 The government of socialist Hungary intruded deeply into work, family, and all other
areas of social life, 45 creating opportunities for women to invoke the state to support their demands for flexibility and accommodation in each institutional sphere, permitting them to
choose how to thrive. 46 Under the liberal regime instituted after the fall of socialist government, welfare was restricted,
forcing women to make accommodations in the private sphere
through family networks or the labor market. The net effects
on women under the two regimes were dramatically different.
Under the first regime, women gained capacity to maneuver
effectively in order to increase their welfare. Under the last
regime, women's freedom to maneuver was severely limited
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See infra Part IV.
AMARYTA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 108-09 (1992).

Seeid.
Seeid.

LYNNE HANEY, INVENTING THE NEEDY: GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF
WELFARE IN HUNGARY 242-44 (2002).

45. Seeid
46. Id
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by their lack of capacity. Consequently, families experienced
far greater difficulties. She calls the quality that these institutions enhanced maneuverability. Maneuverability is promoted, Haney argues, when governments hold major institutions accountable for women's welfare rather than striving to
fix or improve the woman. 47
Maneuverability is increased by the availability of flexible jobs, supportive work places, family resilience, housing
options, continuing medical benefits, retirement security, and
other essential components of individual autonomy. A core
component of this goal is accommodation of flexible careers
that include periods of care work and voluntary unemployment to pursue education or other forms of human capital
growth without the destructive side-effects that characterize
liberal welfare regimes-insecurity and even destitution.
American welfare experiments confirm the superiority of
voluntary and flexible programs of support over longer periods of time, enabling the poor to choose the combination of
decent work, parenting, and education that will enable them
to develop the capacities needed for a better life. As New
Hope demonstrated, enabling individuals to take initiative
and to make choices increases their productivity and family
well-being, benefits that extend to subsequent generations.
Development of capabilities relates to the provision of
welfare in another important way, namely treating the poor
as citizens rather than patients. The social relations theory
of welfare rights advanced by Professor Martha Minow makes
this point. 48 In the early years of welfare administration, the
task of addressing the need for social support for the poor fell
to the Progressive Era social worker.
The social
worker/reformer combined professional knowledge with empathy and direct knowledge of the poor. Minow argues that
the social worker's ability to help came from the clients themselves-from knowledge that they alone possessed and provided to the professionals who helped them. 49 That knowledge included the precise nature of their needs and of the
capacities that could be enhanced to enable them to participate fully in the life of the community. Of course, bringing
47. Id.
48. MARTHA

MINOW, MAKING ALL THE
EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 110-14 (1990).
49. See id. at 245-47.

DIFFERENCE:
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the poor into decision making about how to provide welfare
has far reaching implications. Respecting their knowledge
requires establishing their political voice and their political
citizenship. In sum, the social relations theory says that social citizenship for the poor and other socially marginal
groups will follow from political inclusion.
As knowledge of the causes and effects of poverty deepens, poverty advocates acknowledge that there is a need for
developmental welfare to assist individuals to participate
more effectively in decisions affecting them-therapeutic assistance that increases capabilities of individuals inured to
lives constrained by institutional failure. 50 Many individuals
51
need and seek help in leading more productive lives.
The contradiction between autonomy and need lies at the
heart of all welfare state programs. Full social citizenship
presumes symbolic, but not actual, self-sufficiency. All members of society-especially those fully employed-require considerable social support. This contradiction also besets the
advocacy of community welfare advocates who embrace simultaneously two apparently opposed understandings of
autonomy of the poor: freedom from paternalism based on
class, gender, and race and intervention to help individuals
overcome personal inability to bring about change. Creating
a differently structured context is the key. Restructuring the
context of poverty to alter the behavior of the poor sounds like
the panopticon, the repressive prison created to discipline and
morally reform deviants, described by Michel Foucault. 52
Autonomy should mean creating an inclusive community that
provides the right kind of support in the right way to increase
individual capacity. Distinguishing between repressive and
therapeutic interventions will ultimately depend, as Minow
argues, on democratic accountability of welfare programs to
those who benefit from them. 53
50. See Joel F. Handler, Quiescence: The Scylla and Charibdis of Empowerment, in LABORING BELOW THE LINE: THE NEW ETHNOGRAPHY OF POVERTY,
LOW-WAGE WORK, AND SURVIVAL IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 271 (Frank Munger
ed., 2002) [hereinafter LABORING BELOW THE LINE].
51. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF
THE NEW URBAN POOR (1996); Lucie White, Care at Work, in LABORING BELOW
THE LINE, supra note 50, at 213.
52. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PuNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE
PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
53. See MINOW, supra note 48, at 114.
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Ill. COMMUNITY-BASED ACTIVISM

Activists, organizers, and scholars who have become advocates for those who are increasingly vulnerable in the new
economy have focused on community-based alternatives to
federal welfare programs. They have devoted increasing attention and energy to local coalition building and political activism resources to build a local welfare state. The strategy is
vitally important, and builds on roots stretching back to the
New Deal, the Progressive Era, and even earlier to working
class cooperative movements. 54 Yet there have been trenchant critiques of this movement when it comes to serving the
poorest community members, and even some of its ardent
proponents acknowledge the difficult challenges faced by efforts to rebuild a stronger welfare state at the local level. 55
Community-based projects to enhance the welfare state's
safety net for the poor have taken three overlapping forms:
(1) organizing to exploit the market power of the poor, (2) extending the state's resources through privatization, and (3)
creating a local, more egalitarian welfare state.

A. Utilizing Underdeveloped Market Power
First, some community-based projects exploit the market
power of poor communities to provide what the public safety
net and the job markets do not offer to individuals-better
wages, needed benefits, and greater security. Examples include many successful traditional community economic development corporations and worker cooperatives. 56 The projects
extend a long tradition of organizing on behalf of those at the
economic margins, but as William Simon observes in his examination of the community economic development movement, grassroots organizing has flourished for the past
twenty-five years since conservatives targeted further growth
in the welfare state and began to dismantle existing pro-

54. See KLEIN, supra note 9, at 116. See generally William Forbath, Cons ti·
tutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique, and Reconstruction, 69 FORD. L.
REV. 1821 (2001); MINOW, supra note 48, at 247-57.
55. See WILLIAM SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
MOVEMENT: LAW, BUSINESS, AND THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY (2002).
56. See generally Scott L. Cummings, Developing Cooperatives as a Job
Creation Strategy for Low-Income Workers, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
181 (1999) [hereinafter Cummings, Developing Cooperatives].
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grams. 67 While successful projects often organize the betteroff and most employable working poor, a growing number of
worker cooperatives and mutual assistance projects have
been attempted on behalf of the very poor and former welfare
58
recip~.ents.
Some cooperatives organized among the poorest
members of communities have been successful, but they often
struggle for stability. 69
Among the most successful examples of self-help organizing among marginal and vulnerable members of a community
is Make the Road by Walking, an organization of immigrant
day-laborers on Long Island, New York. 60 The organization's
Workplace Project strove to establish fair treatment of day
workers, one aspect of the organization's broader mission of
meeting the needs of low-wage and often undocumented
workers who are exploited by local businesses and homeowners. 61 By leveraging the growing need for low-wage labor in
Long Island's affluent communities, the Workplace Project
was able to gain community support for the workers' goals
and to obtain passage of state legislation that protected the
workers' right to wages. 62
A second successful example is a standout among the
57. SIMON, supra note 55, at 17-40. See generally PAUL OSTERMAN,
SECURING PROSPERITY: THE AMERICAN LABOR MARKET: How IT HAS CHANGED
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (1999).
58. For example, Working Partnerships, USA has created an ambitious project to provide job and benefit continuity for both low-wage and highly paid
temporary workers in California's Silicon Valley. Established as a ''high-road
temporary staffing firm," the Working Partnerships Membership Association
guarantees access to health benefits, provides training, and operates wellsupported job placement services. Established by the South Bay Labor Council,
Working Partnerships draws on the resources of its members, but also benefits
from additional support from labor unions and large foundations, such as Ford,
Hewlett, and the Campaign for Human Development.
See WORKING
PARTNERSHIP
MEMBERSHIP
Ass'N,
WHO
WE
ARE,
at
http://www.wpmembers.org/who/index/php (last visited Sept. 9, 2003); see also
the
advocacy
group
list
provided
by
the
Linc
Project,
at
http://www.lincproject.org/ (last visited June 9, 2004).
59. Steven Greenhouse, Heath Aides U'ho Get Sick Days?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
14, 2004, at Bl; see also Cooperative Home Care Associates, at
http://www.winwinpartner.com/SmMedSizedBusinesses/smCooperativeAssoc.ht
ml (last visited May 31, 2004).
60. See http://www.maketheroad.org/ (last visited May 31, 2004).
61. Seeid.
62. See Jennifer Gordon, Symposium, Economic Justice in America's Cities:
Visions and Revisions ofa Moment: We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant
Workers, The Workplace Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (1995).
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growing number of health care worker cooperatives employing many former welfare recipients. 63 Cooperative Home
Health Care Associates in Bronx, New York is owned by its
780 employees and provides wages and benefits that exceed
those of similar companies, including a guaranteed work
week and educational benefits. 64 Employees own shares in
the company and elect eight of its twelve board members.
These factors contribute to their willingness to forego salary
and benefit increases for substantial periods of time to insure
the cooperative's fiscal soundness.
B. Privatization of Welfare

A second strategy for extending welfare at the local level
has been to encourage public/private partnerships. Privatization has become one of the pillars of new conservatism, 65 and
the Bush administration has aggressively promoted private
participation in public welfare. 66 Proposals for managed
medical care to replace Medicaid entitlements, private social
security accounts to replace entitlement to fixed retirement
benefits, contracted-out welfare services and administration
to replace the work formerly done by government employees
promise to harness the power of the private market to meet
needs while keeping costs at an efficient level. Of course,
such proposals mean that the intended beneficiaries will bear
the risk of an underperforming market due to market declines, unresponsiveness to consumer preferences, or outright
corruption-all the factors that have always disadvantaged
poor consumers in particular.
Welfare reform has stimulated expansion of an already
vibrant grassroots and nonprofit scene as existing providers
have responded to opportunities to expand their role. In ad-

63. Home health care aide is among the few low-wage occupations for which
there has been a steady or growing demand in many parts of the country. U.S.
DEP'T OF LAB., EMP. & TRAINING ADMIN., HEALTH CARE: INDUSTRY SNAPSHOTGROWTH PATTERN, at http://www.doleta.gov/BRG/lndProf/HealthProfile.cdm
(last visited June 10, 2004).
64. See Cooperative Home Care Associates, supra note 59.
65. MICHAEL KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSIDP: REDEFINING THE AMERICAN
WELFARE STATE 28-29 (2001).
66. See Press Release, President Emphasizes Need for Welfare Reform (July
2, 2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020702-2.html;
see
also
President's
Compassion
Agenda,
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/compassionate/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2004).
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dition, a host of first-timers-new for-profit corporations, converted government contractors, as well as newly-minted notfor-profits-have rushed to respond. Many now benefit from
large contracts with local welfare administrators anxious to
expand their capacity to manage the demands of welfare-towork.67
Many advocates for the poor view the privatization of
welfare with skepticism. 68 Some of the skepticism grows from
the fact that services previously provided by public employees
are being contracted out to private organizations with little
provision for accountability. 69 Unlike public administrators to
whom public accountability laws apply, the commitment of a
private provider to the public goals of welfare is limited to its
contract performance and, in many cases, will quite legitimately be influenced by external market pressures. Particularly sharp criticism has been directed at the Bush administration's promotion of "charitable choice," which emphasizes
giving an important role to faith-based providers. 70 To opponents, trusting faith-based providers to extend the state's capacity to provide a safety net seems to risk undermining constitutional protection for a woman's right to choose, which
some faith-based organizations oppose, and discrimination
against service recipients who do not conform to the life-style
67. See BILL BERKOWITZ, APPLIED RESEARCH CENTER, PROSPECTING
AMONG
THE
POOR:
WELFARE
PRIVATIZATION
(2001),
at
http://www.arc.org/welfare/prospecting.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2004).
68. The outcry is ironic in one sense because the American welfare state always had a large private component in the form of state-encouraged employer
pension and health care, as well as employer financed workers compensation
and unemployment compensation. Contemporary emphasis on devolution has
further privatized core public welfare functions such as welfare-to-work programs and, in some states, even public assistance administration. Public welfare administration has always extended the reach of state programs by incorporating the motivation and resources of charitable organizations into public
institutions. Charitable organizations have long been encouraged to supplement the strictly public parts of our welfare state through large amounts of governmental funding. See KATZ, supra note 65, at 137.
69. See generally Diller, supra note 8.
70. Charitable choice is embodied in the Bush administration's endorsement
of
faith
based
and
community
initiatives.
See
http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/fbci/index.html.
Some mainstream
news reports have been skeptical. See God and Government, NOW WITH BILL
MOYERS,
Sept.
26,
2003,
available
at
http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/churchandstate2.html; see also Ori Nir, Groups
Seek to Monitor Faith-Based Initiatives, FORWARD, Jan. 30, 2004, available at
http://www.forward.com/issues/2004/04. 0 l.30/news2.html.
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or religious preferences of a faith-based provider. 71
While some for-profits obtain contracts to perform outsourced welfare and poverty relief functions, a new field for
socially conscious and politically active not-for-profits has
opened to address the accountability concerns created by
transfer of direct program administration to private organizations. In this climate, grassroots organizing by and on behalf
of poor women has been vigorous. 72 For example, Community
Voices Heard is a particularly successful advocacy group in
New York City. Organized by former welfare recipients,
Community Voices Heard has devoted itself to increasing the
power of poor women by raising members' consciousness and
engaging in public actions to change the image of welfare recipients. In 2000, CVH, together with a community-based action organization, ACORN, led a successful effort to organize
Work Experience Program participants who pressured the
New York City Council to enact a WEP worker protection
law. 73

C. Deepening Democracy at the Local Level
A third form of community-based welfare state enhancement targets local governance through the economic and political power of progressive coalitions. The "deepening democracy" strategy described by Professors Archon Fung and Erik
0. Wright envisions broad coalitions of traditional opponents
or competitors within a semi-autonomous institutional setting-a sector of the economy, a local government, or a school
system. 74 The rationale for such coalition formation is to in71. See generally Daniel K. Storino, Note, Resurrecting the Faith-Based
Plan: Analyzing Government Funding for Religious Social Service Groups, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 389 (2003); see also, e.g., Andrea Boyle, The Faith-Based
Legal
Landscape
(June
2003),
available
at
http://journalism.medill.northwestern.edu/docket/02-1315faith.html.
72. A few of the many coalitions of grassroots organizations fighting poverty
include
Grassroots
Organizing
for
Welfare
Leadership,
at
http://www.ctwo.org/growl/record.html; Grassroots Organizing in Sisterhood, at
http://www.groots.org/; and the Low Income Networking and Communications
Project
of
the
National
Welfare
Law
Center,
at
http://www.lincproject.org/default.asp.
73. See Thomas J. Lueck, Council Overrides Guiliani on 3 Bills, but He
Vows Court Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2000, at Bll.
74. ARCHON FUNG & ERIK OLIN WRIGHT, DEEPENING DEMOCRACY:
INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GoVERNANCE 20-

22 (2003).
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elude enough traditionally competing actors so that when
agreement is reached, the agreement itself is an effective instrument of governance. An effective agreement would reorganize relationships among the participants to achieve gains
in efficiency, productivity, and communal support. In other
words, welfare. AB such, each successful coalition replaces existing competitive relations with more mutually beneficial cooperative relations-thereby becoming a component of a reorganized welfare state. 75
Economist Annetta Bernhardt76 provides an example of a
sectoral coalition, the Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership ("WRTP"), that restructured the employment relationship for many low-wage and welfare-to-work employees. The
WRTP created mutually cooperative arrangements among
business competitors. The business competitors benefited
from a reliable supply of skilled workers at a cost born
equally among competitors for their services. One goal of
such coalitions, according to advocates, is creation of a more
inclusive democratic base, or "deepened democracy," for political, economic, or administrative decision making. This
new democratic base would include some previously excluded,
relatively powerless members of the community who benefited from a redistribution of public or private welfare. 77 Redistributed benefits included better jobs and fringe benefits,
responsive municipal government, environmental amenities,
or better education for their children.
Yet, as Fung and Wright acknowledge, forming coalitions
intended to extract private welfare from traditional adversaries or to achieve other forms of redistribution by agreement
will be particularly problematic for the poor. 78 Of all the pre75. Id at 24.
76. See generally ANNE'ITE BERNHARDT ET AL., DIVERGENT PATHS:
ECONOMIC MOBILITY IN THE NEW AMERICAN LABOR MARKET (2001).
77. Fung and Wright discuss other local democracy experiments that have
achieved at least partial success in a wide range of community settings and policy areas: decentralization in the Chicago school system, participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil, village governance in India, and production of Habitat Conservation Plans under the Endangered Species Act. See generally FUNG
& WRIGHT, supra note 74. See also Dorf & Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and
Emergent Expen'mentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831 (2000).
78. FUNG & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 282-85; see also JOEL F. HANDLER,
DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY 133 (1996). For another critique suggesting that the
inherent inequalities among members of the coalition are likely to create serious problems of long term stability, see Jennifer Gordon, New Governance Mod-
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conditions for success, Fung and Wright suggest that deliberative decision making and commitment will be the most
problematic. 79 Power imbalances will be nearly unavoidable
among participants who attempt to reorganize their relations
with one another in order to achieve, in part, greater welfare
for the poor. 80 Unless an imbalance of power can be checked
by opportunistic alliances, conditional rewards for deliberation by a higher level of authority, or threats by such lowwage worker or consumer friendly groups as unions or local
advocacy organizations, truly deliberative decision making
may not develop. 81 While these examples show that the local
welfare state may be reformed to achieve progressive welfare
state goals, these experiments will not be easy to replicate.
Their reliance on unique circumstances, exceptional political
coalitions, or high levels of social capital suggests that
broader transformation will be difficult to achieve.
Further, factors that limit replication of successful coalitions among members of the middle and working classes,
such as inadequate resources, leadership, and collective action problems, are even more problematic for the working
poor and dependent poor who seek a stronger welfare state.
Central to the evaluation of successful welfare-to-work experiments discussed earlier is the principle that higher initial
costs may be associated with successful programs that enable
the poor to sustain work, support a family, and fully participate as a citizen, including participation in political activism.
As the national economy has weakened, programs like New
Hope, which provide intensive support, have been cut back or
ended. Without additional federal financial support and federal benchmark standards that reflect what has been learned
from successful programs, costly but effective programs will
be severely limited. Moreover, a politically weak minority
such as the poor, who have overlapping political disadvantages of poverty and race, is unlikely to achieve changes in
policies at the state or local level on its own. Further, recent
els, New Roles ofRights: Lessons from the Underground Economy, N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE (forthcoming 2004). Similarly, Simon's penetrating appraisal
of the Community Economic Development movement also concludes that the
instability of low income communities poses a substantial threat to sustained,
effective representation of their interests. See SIMON, supra note 55.
79. FUNG & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 3-25.
80. Id
81. Id
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governmental reforms that delegate new responsibilities to
frontline workers to help welfare recipients with work and
time limits only exacerbate the problems of "street-level" bureaucracy unless there is a change in the political power balance at the local level. 82
A model for co-opting the local welfare state that is more
responsive to the problems of powerless groups has been ad83
vanced by Scott Cummings. Cummings argues that the poor
must form broad political coalitions comprised of natural allies committed to economic justice before engaging in peak
bargaining with adversaries. Natural allies include grassroots organization, religious groups, and unions whose goals
are closely related to the economic justice needs of the poor.
Examples of successful collective action by such coalitions to
achieve gains for poor communities include living wage campaigns,84 low-wage labor cooperatives, 85 and, importantly,
86
utilization of publicly subsidized local development.
Cummings also cites examples of sectoral economic development
similar to WRTP, but with an important difference from Fung
and Wright's proposal, namely successful community-based
organizing .that preceded negotiation and enabled representatives of poor communities to bring considerable pressure to
bear on reluctant resource holders subject to public mandates.87
Cummings' "new model" community economic development offers substantial advantages for the poor over the traditional model. The new model CED includes the poor, but it
does so by recognizing that their inclusion is necessarily a political act. The poor will be served through redistribution requiring a shift in power. Second, Cummings argues that the
new model CED will resist market trends. 88 It would main82. See generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET LEVEL BUREAUCRACY (1983)
(documenting effective control of the implementation of policies by frontline
workers); see also HANDLER, supra note 78, at 133-68 (describing rare instances
of empowerment of dependent persons who must rely on politicians, employers,
or administrators for access to benefits).
83. Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development as Progressive
Politics: Toward Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV.
399 (2001) [hereinafter Cummings, Progressive Politics]. .
84. Id. at 466-67.
85. Id. at 4 72; see also Cummings, Developing Cooperatives, supra note 56.
86. See Cummings, Progressive Politics, supra note 83, at 480-83.
87. Id at 487-91.
88. Id

1020

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

Vol: 44

tain inclusion of the poor even when the market would create
insurmountable barriers to their participation in the labor
market or entrepreneurship.
Two important aspects of all three strategies-market
power, privatization, and deepening democracy-create particular challenges for advocates for the poorest community
members. First, how should the goals of programs for the
poorest be defined? Cummings has raised one of the most serious concerns about some types of local economic development advocacy, the tendency to adopt narrow market strategies for small geographically defined poverty communities.
Projects that depend solely upon resources available within
an impoverished neighborhood ignore the fundamental structural barriers to economic equality and inevitably fail to help
the poorest. In addition to their poverty, many members of
these communities experience more barriers both to employment and to participation in political action. Barriers include
lack of education, health problems, family instability, and
domestic violence. Dependence upon social networks that are
not easily adapted to employment at will is customary in the
low-wage labor market, assuming a larger, more participatory
community role.
Second, local state projects typically require an initial investment of resources necessary for bargaining with coalition
partners, providers, or public authorities. While there are
examples of successful empowerment strategies for the poor
that have required little initial financial resource investment,
they have depended upon unique conditions creating interdependence of powerful and powerless partners or the presence
of more powerful allies (e.g., unions on behalf of workers, progressive advocacy organizations on behalf of low-wage workers or care workers). 89 Common sense seems to suggest that
the poorest will be at a severe disadvantage in negotiations
for improved welfare institutions.
In sum, advocates for local state strategies for enhancing
the welfare of the poor must focus on increasing the capacity
of members of the poorest communities for political action as
well as self-help. Further, community advocates seeking political strategies must find means for asset creation or conversion by turning physical, cultural, and social capital of the
89. HANDLER, supra note 78.
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inner city and other poor communities into working capital. 90

IV. INTERROGATING LOCAL WELFARE STRATEGIES
Strengthening the capacity of local institutions for inclusion and for welfare can help poor men and women increase
their "maneuverability" by redirecting resources to training,
jobs, day care, housing, education, and services that increase
their capability to meet their own needs and their responsibilities for care work. These needs are not met by the present
labor market or by the downsized national welfare state. The
small but growing number of community-based projects that
have successfully addressed some of the welfare needs of the
poorest individuals may hold tentative lessons for the next
generation of activists and organizers attempting to grow the
local welfare state.
A. Lesson One: The Nature ofAdvocacy Is Important.
Scott Cummings argues that basing community economic
development on the market potential in a particular
neighborhood limits effectiveness. This is true because leverage is restricted to a particular market; and because poor
communities acting alone rarely have the political clout to
play what has been called the "inside game" of urban politics.
As part of the "inside game," major resources and opportunities are allocated among the dominant power holders. The
economic disadvantage of marginal and minority members of
a community is a political problem, not an economic problem.
Therefore, the response to economic disadvantage experienced in poor neighborhoods must be to coordinate political
reform that emphasizes structural change rather than meeting the needs of specific urban neighborhoods. 91 Cummings
proposes a new model for community development advocacy
for the poor and other marginal groups that differs from traditional market oriented community development in three
90. Some scholars in writing about the culture of poverty and the underclass have contributed to the perception that the poor have few assets or capabilities that might make them successful coalition partners in the politics of a
more progressive local welfare state. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 51. Thus, in
addition to countering the "myth and ceremony" of moral politics on the right,
advocates for the poor must also reexamine the perceptions of poor communities
held by "experts" on poverty.
91. Cummings, Progressive Politics, supra note 83, at 447.
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ways: (1) the goal is broadly based economic justice, (2) advocates seek coalition with other community-based actors such
as clergy and unions, and (3) the movement need not be spatially bounded but rather seeks sectoral, regional, national, or
even transnational coalitions. 92
Cummings identifies examples of successful coalitions,
including living wage campaigns such as the alliance of Boston grassroots advocates led by ACORN, the AFL-CIO, and
Greater Boston Legal Services, 93 and community development
coalitions such as the Figeroa Corridor Coalition for Economic
Justice in Los Angeles, a group of community organizations,
unions, and residents that won a "community benefits plan"
that included parks, local hiring, and an affordable housing
set-aside from developers of a billion-dollar sports and entertainment complex. 94
But critics have rightly questioned the sustainability of
such coalitions. The poorest members of communities typically lack resources to initiate or sustain political action and
many may lack even the capacity to participate effectively as
members. Fortunately, effective collective action is not determined by initial levels of income or social capital alone.
The Workplace Project95 illustrates the power of poor, dependent, and undocumented laborers aided by an inspired organizer. This organizer tapped the workers' own potential and
drew in unlikely allies on the basis of their economic selfinterest. But at least initially, welfare recipients seldom have
the right kind of social capital for such a movement-indeed,
they are dependent upon welfare not only because they are
economically poor, but also because they lack social capital
that many other poor families can rely upon. 96 Plenty of
grass-roots poverty organizations exist, but they provide mutual aid rather than market power, and many of those depend
on external funding and organization. Again, Make the Road
by Walking provides a rare example of a grassroots movement that was successful at the "outside game"-i.e. in a re-

92. Id at 458-64.
93. Id at 470.
94. Id. at 480.
95. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
96. Julia R. Henly, Informal Support Networks and the Maintenance of
Low- Wage Jobs, in LABORING BELOW THE LINE, supra note 50, at 179; see also
WILSON, supra note 51.
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gional labor market.
These criticisms lead to a second lesson.

B. Lesson Two: Assets Are Needed to Build Alliances and to
Bargain with Opponents.
Advocates can help develop at least three types of assets
needed to fulfill the promise of community-based organizing
for increased public and private welfare in poor communities:
cultural, labor, and economic assets.
First, the cultural assets of poor neighborhoods often include strong religious institutions, 97 effective networks supporting family survival, 98 an ethic of care in single-parent and
extended families, 99 and values supporting work and mobility.Ioo Many poverty scholars have been quick to dismiss the
experience of individuals in urban neighborhoods as part of
the problem of poverty and recommend changing such cultures by transforming neighborhood institutions and altering
the opportunity structure. IOI Yet, such neighborhoods not
only shape and sustain values that should be respected and
fostered, but they provide considerable social capital that
may, with leadership and experience, be turned to organizing
and activism. The lessons learned from grassroots activism
have often centered on the importance of developing leadership, and in turn drawing out the potential of the considerable social capital that resides in poor communities. I02
It is no surprise that many organizations founded by
former welfare recipients and poor persons place consciousness raising and leadership development high on their

97. See HAROLD MACDOUGALL, BLACK BALTIMORE: A NEW THEORY OF
COMMUNITY (1993); Mary Pattillo-McCoy, Church Culture as a Strategy of Action in a Black Community, 63 AM. Soc. REV. 767 (1998).
98. See CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A
BLACK COMMUNITY (1974); COPING WITH POVERTY: THE SOCIAL CONTEXTS OF
NEIGHBORHOOD, WORK AND FAMILY IN THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN COMMUNITY
(Sheldon Danzinger & Ann Chih Lin eds., 2000).
99. See JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE,
RESISTANCE, AND THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (2001); STACK, supra note 98.
100. See KATHERINE s. NEWMAN, No SHAME IN MY GAME, THE WORKING
POOR IN THE INNER CITY 186 (1999).
101. See generally WILSON, supra note 51.
102. See SAUL D. ALINSKY, REVEILLE FOR RADICALS 64 (1989); HARRY BOYTE,
BACKYARD REVOLUTION: UNDERSTANDING THE NEW CITIZEN MOVEMENT 44
(1980).
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agenda. 103 Their emphasis not only presumes that the poor
have cultural resources that are valuable and can be mobilized to support activism. The organizations also often assume that the poor should lead their own movements. Further, they assume that participation and leadership must be
learned, and that opportunities to learn will be particularly
valuable for persons who have been marginalized and excluded.104 This learning process is especially important for
leaders of poor communities who must contend with better
resourced and more experienced allies as well as opponents in
building the kind of coalitions described by Cummings.
Second, even the poorest communities have considerable
labor assets. Worker cooperatives have been among the most
successful enterprises among the poor and underemployed
workers in poverty communities. 105 While worker co-ops ultimately aim to provide goods or services for the market, poor
mothers, as market workers or care workers, often require
supporting services themselves. Services critical to successful
employment and care work may take the form of training,
flexible child care, and, as New Hope demonstrated, counseling. For members of poor communities, individual assistance
and support, institutional change and community advocacy,
go hand in hand. Such services can be provided through mutual support organizations created and staffed by community
members, and are elements of the model observable in examples discussed earlier such as Community Voices Heard and
The Workplace Project, organizations staffed by members of
the community served. 106
The special requirements of the working poor create special resource problems for worker cooperatives that serve
them because of the costs of maintaining services needed to
facilitate and support working single parents, workers requiring additional training, or workers who have special medical
103. For example, Welfare Rights Initiative, Community Voices Heard, National Congress of Neighborhood Women, and Grassroots Organizations Operating Together in Sisterhood all stress the importance of leadership development
and consciousness-raising.
104. Such assumptions are supported by Lucie White's research on personal
transformations that have occurred within Headstart. See White, supra note
51.

105. See Cummings, Developing Cooperatives, supra note 56; see also supra
note 82 and accompanying text.
106. See supra Part 111.A-B.
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needs. Access to professional services is still more problematic because of its expense. Thus, development of the labor
assets of individuals in the poorest communities may require
strategies that make use of the devolution of welfare programs and funding for public/private partnerships with notfor-profits which are based in poor needy communities.
The dependence of cultural asset and labor asset development on external financial resources underscores a third
kind of asset formation, physical and financial resource development. Poor inner city communities have employed
community economic development corporations for development housing and businesses. 101 Likewise, development of
community-based financial institutions is perceived as having
particular value as an economic and political empowerment
strategy. 108
The federal government can help provide resources for
poor communities, of course. The government's role need not
involve massive redistribution, but rather setting benchmarks for the use of resources and entitlements provided to
businesses and employers, banks, and local governments.
And this leads to a third lesson.
C. Lesson Three: Rights May Still Be the Key.

The Workplace Project's successful advocacy for a tough
minimum wage law covering illegal immigrant day laborers
in New York 109 suggests that new rights yielded two important resources. First, the law set an enforceable standard for
employment negotiations between immigrant workers and
employers. Equally important, new rights helped to build the
capacity of the immigrants for further action by strengthening their self-perceptions and expectations of inclusion within
the community. Both effects were critical to the future of the
Project and its advocacy.
The present ideological climate favors experimentation
with local replacement of national welfare policies, especially
107. See Michael H. Schill, Assessing the Role of Community Development
Corporations in Inner City Economic Development, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 173 (1997).
108. Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community Economic Em·
powerment: Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive Racial Justice, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1463 (1994).
109. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
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when driven by the initiative of private actors. The key
structural characteristic of the setting in which the experiment can succeed in redistributing resources for welfare is
devolution-together the actors must be able to exercise real
power. Fung and Wright note that an agreement among the
parties will be effective and constitutive of their future relations only if backed by a higher authority, in most cases public authority, a condition they term "coordinated decentralization."110 The higher authority must agree to respect and
enforce the decision reached through deliberation among local
actors. It follows that agreements to enhance the local welfare state cannot be voluntary, but they must be binding and
enforceable-i.e. backed in some way by governmental authority.
Economic development often depends on a variety of public subsidies, such as low cost land, low cost loans, tax breaks,
and public grants. 111 Linkages in state or federal legislation
can require expenditure of public funds in ways that benefit
underserved, poor, and politically marginal communities. By
their very nature, such linkages create a space for dealings
between poor communities, developers, and local governments about exploitation, taking, or transformation of community resources. Such dealings are often initially not deliberative but confrontational in order to place satisfaction of the
legislative requirement for linkage on the public agenda.
Thus, to gain resources, a poor community must often mobilize first and leverage its initial investment in consciousness
raising, leadership training, and coalition building through
political action.
Coalitions of community-based advocates have been successful in exerting pressure for inclusion of affordable housing, local hiring requirements, and other community welfare
benefits. A particularly fruitful source of local leverage arises
under the federal Housing and Urban Development Act that
requires public housing authorities and other HUD recipients
to provide training and employment to low and very lowincome persons. These requirements have been strengthened
110. FUNG & WRIGHT, supra note 74.
111. Id at 483-87; see also, e.g., The Housing and Urban Development Act of
1968, 12 U.S.C. § 1701(u) (2001). Cummings notes that there are many federal
programs that similarly link community development funds to redistribution.
See Cummings, Progressive Politics, supra note 83, at 484 n.415.
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in recent years notwithstanding the shrinking safety net for
welfare recipients and low-income workers. 112
Advocates for community welfare development and the
local welfare state know that governments must still play an
important role. While the energy and vision for contemporary
activism is local, rights and redistribution are essential for
the success of efforts to extend the local welfare state to address poverty. We can now understand better why public resources remain important in spite of the barriers to obtaining
them. Successful coalition building and advocacy for redistribution at the local level requires devolution of money earmarked for community building together with regulation to
support wider, and ideally deliberative, participation in negotiations for welfare enhancing development. Devolution can
increase the likelihood that local governmental interventions
will support development of decent work, maneuverability,
and community risk sharing.
V. CONCLUSION
Is there hope for poverty relief beyond welfare reform?
John Gilliam's sensitive interviews with welfare recipients offer profound insights into the effects of welfare administration on identity and capacity for employment and care
work. 113 He discovers in these interviews a counter discourse
to welfare surveillance, a discourse of care and connection.
He argues that the existence of the discourse is the first step
toward building a new political community. 114 By a new political community he means a community at the national level
encompassing all those who want the welfare state to expand
rather than narrow their autonomy and to strengthen indigenous visions of well-being and security rather than the symbolic needs of a national political community.
We need a vision for community advocacy. Welfare
rights ascended when the poor were viewed as citizens and
declined as dependency was characterized as a disease and
the needy poor were stigmatized as incapable of full social
citizenship.
One such conception is the risk sharing, community112. Cummings, Progressive Politics, supra note 83, at 483-85.
113. GILLIOM, supra note 99.
114. Id. at 134-36.

1028

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

Vol: 44

based vision embraced by progressives during the New Deal.
This vision is alive today, and it is reflected in the continuing
success of advocacy for rights enabling community participation in local development. Communitarian values underlie
the EITC as well as devolution of policy making to local deliberation (including public participation requirements; expanded use of nonprofit providers, and local priority setting
for welfare).
Further, governmental mandates can target the poor in
ways that are consistent with the dominant market ideology:
poor families displaced by development should receive compensating benefits as a form of cost internalization; services
and facilities provided for the poor should include flexible
benefits to make ending poverty a sustainable goal-through
adequate training, living wage employment, and supporting
services; and work should pay.
As Jennifer Gordon has reminded us, standard setting
provides a framework for inclusion and for deliberation about
community level welfare state policymaking. Rights can
strengthen the capacity of marginalized groups for self-help
by legitimating their sense of themselves as empowered citizens.
There are allies in this struggle. Many states have tried
to use welfare reform to better their programs, and they have
not left recipients cut from TANF wholly unsupported. The
reality of welfare reform is that there has been a transfer of
fiscal burdens but not control of its core political features
such as employment. The net fiscal burden and false promise
of local control makes local governments potential allies in resisting welfare reform as presently structured. Of course,
many community activists-including religious organizations
and labor unions-remain engaged in welfare advocacy for
the long run.
Our inquiry brings us back to our starting point: the poor
need a national movement for welfare rights and for redistribution. There is new hope for such a movement. The promise
of deploying the local welfare state on behalf of the poor offers
guidance for politically feasible advocacy. Washington consensus on devolution and privatization can be made to work
for the poor by making available the right kind of resources
and power to facilitate local governance that supports inclusive community development.

